By increasing the residual working horizon of employed individuals, pension reforms that raise minimum retirement age are likely to affect the returns to investments in health-promoting behaviours before retirement, with consequences for individual health. Using the exogenous variation in minimum retirement age induced by a sequence of Italian pension reforms during the 1990s and 2000s, we show that Italian males aged 40 to 49 reacted to the longer time to retirement by raising regular exercise and by reducing smoking and regular alcohol consumption. Dietary habits were also affected, with positive consequences on obesity and self-reported satisfaction with health.
Previous literature has found inconsistent effects of tracking students in secondary school on student performance using various ways to alleviate the endogeneity in tracking. Sociological literature argues that the threat for war with and invasion by the French around the 1800s induced European countries to introduce mass public education systems. I use this theory to estimate the effect of tracking on student performance in Europe, instrumenting tracking by the political pressure caused by the Napoleonic Wars. The relation between political pressure by Napoleon and tracking is strong and leads in the second stage to a consistent positive effect of tracking on student performance. One important limitation of this analysis is that it is reasonable to assume that political pressure from Napoleon influenced many facets of European countries.
Much research has been done into the emergence of mass education systems, primarily by studying the social origin of the education system, the introduction of compulsory schooling laws, or the expansion of enrolment rates. However, little is known about the origin of the characteristics of these newly formed systems. Ramirez and Boli (1987) argue that the threat for war with and invasion by the French around the 1800s induced European countries to introduce mass public education systems. This paper empirically establishes whether political pressure from Napoleon is related to the levels of differentiation and standardization of European education systems. I find that the political pressure from France is related to differentiation, but less to standardization of the content of instruction, and not at all to the existence of central exam and administrative standardization.
In dit rapport worden de resultaten van de Sociale Innovatie Monitor Limburg 2015
gepresenteerd. Dit onderzoek naar sociale innovatie in Limburgse bedrijven werd van
september tot november 2015 uitgevoerd door het Lectoraat Employability van Zuyd
Hogeschool en het Research Centre for Education and Labour market (ROA) Maastricht
University, in samenwerking met de Limburgse Werkgevers Vereniging (LWV).
Sule Alan (University of Essex)
Giorgio Brunello (University of Padova)
Thomas Dohmen (University of Bonn/Maastricht University)
Bernd Fitzenberger (Humboldt University of Berlin)
David Gill (University of Oxford)
Raymond Montizaan (ROA)
Pia Pinger (University of Bonn)
Kjell Salvanes (Norwegian School of Economics)
Vegard Skirbekk (Columbia University)
Rolf van der Velden (ROA)
Dinand Webbink (Erasmus University)
Herman van de Werfhorst (University of Amsterdam)
Ludger Woesmann (Ifo Institute)
This paper introduces a technique to elicit voter preferences, by integrating multiattribute compositional analyses (Macs) with a voting advice application (VAA). The technique requires users to make trade-offs between different positions on a single issue, and between different issues. MacVAAs more closely resemble the electoral decision-making process in elections in which more than two parties participate than classic VAAs. MacVAA’s also overcomes the assumption of issue orthogonality and assumption of rationality that classic VAA erroneously make. Results of a field application of the technique during the 2012 Dutch parliamentary elections in 2012 are presented. Advantages and disadvantages are discussed.
Building on Lazear’s skill weights approach, we study the effect of having more or less heterogeneity in the training curriculum on supply of and demand for apprenticeship training. Modernizations of training curricula provide us with a quasi-experimental setting as these modernizations can be seen as a relatively exogenous shock. We argue that firms will train more apprentices when they have more choice options in the training curriculum because of (1) the higher productivity of graduates who have acquired more skills that are relevant for the firm, and (2) firms’ higher market power in the wage bargaining process with graduates. We test this hypothesis on data on the supply of apprenticeship places in Germany in all occupations from 2004 to 2014. We find that a more heterogeneous curriculum increases both firms’ supply of and students’ demand for training places.
In this article, the relation between firms’ engagement in apprenticeship training
and two important economic preferences, i.e. the decision maker’s altruism and time
preference, is analyzed. Firstly, the relation between these two preferences and a firm’s
decision to provide apprenticeship places (extensive margin) is examined. Secondly, for
firms that train, the effect on the amount of investments in apprenticeship training
(intensive margin) is analyzed. The results show that the degree of altruism of a decision
maker is positively, albeit weakly significant, associated to the probability to provide
apprenticeship places as well as substantially related to the amount of investments
in apprenticeship training. Time preferences are not related to the training decision
(extensive margin) but significantly related to the amount of investments in training.
This paper estimates peer effects in a university context where students are randomly
assigned to sections. While students benefit from better peers on average, lowachieving
students are harmed by high-achieving peers. Analyzing students’ course
evaluations suggests that peer effects are driven by improved group interaction rather
than adjustments in teachers’ behavior or students’ effort. We further show, building on
Angrist (2014), that classical measurement error in a setting where group assignment
is systematic can lead to substantial overestimation of peer effects. With random
assignment, as is the case in our setting, estimates are only attenuated.